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ABSTRACT
Neuroscientist Benjamin Libet has conducted a 
series of experiments that reveal the existence 
of certain neural processes in the brain of 
human subjects, initiating an action prior to the 
human subject’s intention to act, thus seemingly 
threatening our idea of free will. The purpose 
of this paper is to show how these processes 
do not disprove any idea of free will one might 
have as one would, if accepting such a thesis, be 
committing two distinct mereological fallacies 
and ultimately, would treat the human subject as 
inhabiting some of its parts as opposed to being 
the sum of its parts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of 
experiments where his objective was to determine the exact time the 
brain of a human subject initiates an action and, subsequently, the 
time of the subject in question consciously deciding to perform the 
action as well as performing it.1 According to these findings, certain 
neural activities (called the readiness potential or RP) in the brain of 
the subject take place before the act is made and unbeknownst to the 
subject who only after a brief period after RP makes the conscious 
intention to act. Fully formed actions are thus organized in three 
consecutive stages: the readiness potential, the intention to act, and 
the act itself. Libet concludes that these results clearly indicate that 
“volitional” acts are not volitional at all since the brain would initiate 
them before the human subject forms the intention to perform the act. 
Free will could therefore be an illusion. 
I aim to show that free will is not threatened by Libet’s findings. 
His experiments are problematic because they are committed to an 
awkward form of dualism that includes two mereological fallacies. For 
the results to disprove free will, they must necessarily treat the human 
subject as consisting of two different substances, and Libet does so by 
privileging the subject’s conscious awareness. Anything outside of this 
limited awareness, it follows, is given a property disconnected from 
the subject and treated as though not an authentic part of it. This is 
a peculiar commitment to make, even if there were a justification for 
it. While the results prove the existence of certain neural activities 
initiating an action before the subject’s awareness of it, they do not 
prove that there is no free will. Thus, my critique is not directed at the 
existence of these neural activities, themselves, but rather at how one 
decides to consider them in relation to the human subject. 
I start by summarizing the format and conclusions of Libet’s 
experiment. Next, I present two arguments one might draw from 
Libet’s conclusions and show that each commits a mereological fallacy. 
II. THE FORMAT OF THE EXPERIMENT
Libet instructed the participants of his experiment to look at a 
moving dot that indicated the time and asked them to move their 
wrist at a time of their choosing, all the while their brain activity was 
monitored. They were so asked to make a personal note of the precise 
time—based on where the dot pointed—they had decided to move 
their wrist. 
1 Benjamin Libet, “Do We Have Free Will?,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free 
Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 551, 10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Libet noticed that each time the participants moved their wrist, 
the act was preceded by a “specific electrical change in the brain 
that begins 550 msec before the act.”2 This was called the “readiness 
potential” or RP. In addition to preceding the actual act by 550 msec, 
it also preceded the subject’s intention to make the act by 350-400 
msec. The act itself took place ultimately 200 msec after the subject had 
made the conscious intention to do it. A fully formed action was thus 
consecutively comprised of:       
       1. the readiness potential      
       2. the conscious decision to act 350-400 msec later    
       3. the performance of the act 200 msec later     
Parts (2) and (3) were conscious to the subject while part (1) was not. 
Libet concluded that these findings clearly indicated volitional acts 
to not be volitional.3 While these results could threaten the idea that 
humans have free will, Libet did not yet fully affirm this, and specified 
that the participants could decide not to make the act after becoming 
aware of the intention to do so: “The role of conscious free will 
would be, then, not to initiate a voluntary act, but rather to control 
occurrences of the act.”4 An action could then consecutively look like 
this instead:         
       1. the readiness potential       
       2. the conscious decision to act      
       3. the subject deciding against performing the act    
       4. the subject not performing the act 
For Libet, part (3) is where free will is taking place. The outcome in 
part (4) is therefore not as wholly determined by part (1) as implied 
in the first example. Though I grant that the human subject’s ability 
to veto the act in (3) could be understood as an act of free will, I deny 
that the existence of RP negates free will. Thus, I argue that Libet 
does not need to resort to (3) to preserve our idea of free will. 
III. ASSESSING THE ARGUEMENTS
Syllogistically, the first argument I draw from Libet is:
1. If human subjects’ brains initiate an action before the human   
           subjects make a conscious decision to so, then human subjects   
           do not have free will       
       2. Human subjects’ brains initiate an action before the humans   
            make a conscious decision to do so             
       3. Therefore, human subjects do not have free will 
2 Libet, “Do We Have,” 551.
3 Such a conclusion necessarily stems from an idea that part (1) is the 
determining factor in the act.
4 Libet, “Do We Have,” 560.
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There is, clearly, something queer about this argument. What 
or where, exactly, is the human subject supposed to be, and what is 
the irrelation to the brain? After all, the brain is a part of the human 
subject. So, how can it be that the brain is performing certain functions 
without the human subject? Such would be tantamount to the legs of a 
human subject walking without the human subject, but that is clearly 
nonsense. When we utter certain phrases like,“My leg is hurting,” we 
do not mean that our leg has told us that it is hurting, and now, we 
express this hurt on behalf of it. The leg is not hurting, it is the human 
subject whose leg it is who is hurting. 
This form of ascribing to the constituent parts of some attributes 
that logically apply only to the whole is often called a “mereological 
fallacy.” When committing a mereological fallacy, one says things 
like,“The brain is thinking,” not realizing that “thinking” can only be 
done by the human subject. As Bennett and Hacker write
It is not that as a matter of fact brains do not think, hypothesize and 
decide, see and hear, ask and answer questions, rather, it makes no 
sense to ascribe such predicates or their negations to the brain. The 
brain neither sees nor is it blind—just as sticks and stones are not awake, 
but they are not asleep either. The brain does not hear, but it is not deaf, 
any more than trees are deaf. The brain makes no decisions, but neither 
is it is indecisive. Only what can decide, can be indecisive. So too, the 
brain cannot be conscious, only the living creature whose brain it is can 
be conscious—or unconscious.5
Libet’s argument commits the mereological fallacy by having the brain 
initiate an action when, in fact, the brain can do no such thing. Only 
the human subject can initiate an action, just like it is only the human 
subject who can walk, not their legs. This is a conceptual clarification, 
but there is a related scientific one as well.
When we think, it is tempting to say that we are thinking with 
our brain, as if the brain is the sole engineer in that enterprise. But the 
brain is only a segment in an otherwise intricate chain of processes 
that altogether constitute thinking. Putting a brain in a vat, as some 
epistemological thought experiments would have it, will not allow 
the brain to think. For the brain to have thoughts it needs oxygen 
transposed via blood vessels from the lungs. The lungs, themselves, 
need a respiratory system to obtain oxygen from outside the body. 
This, in turn, requires there to be oxygen to obtain from the outside. 
Cutting all these other components off from the act of thinking and 
having the brain pull the ship alone would yield disappointing results. 
5 M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 72.
Even designating the brain as the essential component of this process 
seems unfair and arbitrary. The essential component—or rather the 
essential whole—is the human subject in possession of all the faculties 
within a certain environment.
Realizing the absurdity of the previous argument, one could say 
that the neural processes compromising the readiness potential are 
simply subconscious, and that it is, hence, not initiated by the human 
subject consciously. In this way, we avoid the awkwardness of talking 
about the brain making decisions and trying to relate these to the 
human subject. Instead, we divide the human subject into an “inner 
amalgam” of the conscious and the subconscious. Syllogistically:
1. If human subjects are not conscious of the processes involved in  
           their decision making, then they do not have free will   
       2. Human subjects are not conscious of the processes involved in     
           their decision making      
       3. Therefore, human subjects do not have free will
This argument appears sounder than the previous one. In fact, it is 
precisely this type of argument Sam Harris is thinking of when he 
writes,“Consider what it would take to actually have free will. You 
would need to be aware of all the factors that determine your thoughts 
and actions, and you would need to have complete control over those 
factors.”6
But now, two questions emerge: What, exactly, are the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for something to be labeled conscious as 
opposed to subconscious and vice versa? Does the human subject as a 
whole have free will? 
However, while the human subject is not conscious of the 
processes involved in their decision making—the subconscious 
claiming ownership of those processes—the subconscious too is a 
part of the human subject. Thus, the human subject is both the entity 
where the conscious resides and where the subconscious processes are 
taking place. In other words, a part of the human subject does not have 
free will because another part of the human subject is precluding that 
possibility. 
Furthermore, how does one decide what experiences are to be 
classified as conscious as opposed to subconscious? Consider the act 
of walking; this act is often performed subconsciously. However, 
situations where walking is consciously performed are far from 
uncommon, so what do we classify walking as?
6 Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012), 32.
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One way to justify all of this would be to think of the human 
subject in a Cartesian fashion where some acts are thought to stem 
from a more authentic nature of the human subject, with all else being 
somewhat inessential. This more authentic nature is often termed 
“the self” and is what the pronoun, “I,” is sometimes meant to point 
to. But how does one justify attributing the “I” only to that which is 
conscious? If the “I” is only to be found in the conscious part of the 
human subject, could we say that the subconscious part where these 
subconscious processes are happening, has free will? If so, a part of the 
human subject does have free will and saying,“I do not have free will,” 
will thus have to mean that the“I” is separate from the human subject, 
while simultaneously being a part of it. This culminates in a paradox 
where the human subject both has and has not free will.
This move to a Cartesian dualism, where some arbitrarily selected 
segments of the human subject (those constituting the “conscious 
realm”) are treated as an expression of its more authentic nature seems 
an utter misconception. “What is hopelessly confused is the supposition 
that the subject of experience is an entity within a human being.”7 
This argument, like the previous one, is guilty of committing 
some version of a mereological fallacy. This time, however, it is more 
informative to use Anthony Kenny’s similar term, homunculus fallacy, 
“since its most naive form is tantamount to the postulation of a little 
man within a man to explain human experience and behavior.”8  
The fallacy of the argument consists of treating the human subject 
as made up of (in this case) two homunculi where one is even depicted 
as being more important than the other and personifying the “real 
you” when in fact, “you” can be nothing but the whole of the human 
subject—or both homunculi, if you will. As with the designation of 
the brain as the essential component of thinking, the designation of 
which is taking place within the human subject’s conscious realm as 
some essential nature of the human subject is unfair, arbitrary, and 
fallacious. Furthermore, the awkward dualism the argument promotes 
ultimately culminates in a paradox.    
IV. CONCLUSION
The main thesis of this paper is that Libet’s experiment, powerful 
and admirably ambitious as it is, does not disprove free will. I assume, 
without further argument, that any definition of “free will” one might 
appeal to would not make his findings more likely to disprove it.
7 P. M. S. Hacker, Human Nature: The Categorial Framework (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007), 259.
8 Anthony Kenny, “The Homunculus Fallacy,” in The Legacy of Wittgenstein 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 125.
The first objection is against that of treating the brain as a subject 
for psychological predicates. The second is asking if it would, in any 
way, be justified to suggest that anything taking place subconsciously 
is less within the domain of the human subject as that which is taking 
place consciously. I have argued that it would not be justified to suggest 
that; the human subject is the sum of their parts and cannot be reduced 
to some of their parts. The questions of free will are deeply perplexing, 
but Libet’s argument does not threaten any belief in the truth of free 
will.
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